The Voters Voted For This?

Here’s an list of major Biden-administration policies (or approaches strongly associated with Democratic priorities) that were frequently criticized as out of step with majority public opinion, along with what the second Trump administration has done to modify or reverse them (as of late 2026).

I will stick to verifiable actions and note polling patterns where they are well-documented. “Most of the people” is measured by national polls; results vary by exact question wording and timing, but the patterns below were consistent across multiple major surveys in 2022–2024.

1. Transgender Athletes in Girls’/Women’s Sports

Biden-era approach:
The Department of Education proposed (2023) and pursued rules under Title IX that would have limited or prohibited schools from imposing blanket bans on transgender students competing according to their gender identity. Broader Title IX regulations expanded the definition of sex discrimination to include gender identity. The specific athletics rule was delayed and later withdrawn in December 2024 amid controversy and lawsuits.

Public opinion: Multiple polls (YouGov, Manhattan Institute, etc.) consistently showed 60%+ of Americans favoring the requirement that athletes compete according to biological sex / sex assigned at birth, especially in girls’ and women’s categories.

Trump reversal:
Early 2025 executive orders defined sex as binary and biological for federal purposes and directed that biological males not compete in women’s sports. The administration has actively enforced Title IX against schools and states that allow transgender women/girls in female categories.

2. Border Security and Immigration Enforcement

Biden-era approach:

• Ended or restricted several Trump-era tools (Remain in Mexico / MPP, border wall construction priority, certain asylum restrictions).

• Expanded humanitarian parole programs (notably CHNV for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, Venezuelans).

• Heavy use of catch-and-release and notices to appear while asylum claims were processed.

• Record high southwest border encounters in FY 2022 and 2023.

• Later tightened rules in mid-2024 (asylum restrictions when encounters were high).

Public opinion: Consistently high majorities viewed the border situation as a serious or major problem and favored stronger enforcement.

Trump reversals of Biden policies (2025 onward):

• Reinstated and expanded Remain in Mexico.

• Restored and accelerated border wall construction.

• Suspended or sharply limited many parole programs and refugee admissions.

• Ended CBP One app processing as previously used.

• Declared a border emergency, increased military support, expanded expedited removal, and launched large-scale interior enforcement/deportation efforts.

• Encounter numbers dropped dramatically.

3. Other Notable Policies Frequently Cited as Unpopular with Majorities

Policy Area Biden-era Approach Typical Public Opinion Pattern (2022–2024) Trump Administration Action Gender identity in federal policy Recognized gender identity in many federal contexts, documents, and protections Majority preferred biological sex definitions, especially for sports, prisons, and shelters Executive orders defining sex as biological/binary; restricted gender-identity recognition in federal policy DEI programs in federal government Expanded diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives across agencies Mixed to negative among independents and the broader public on race/gender preferences Executive orders ending federal DEI programs and related mandates Student loan forgiveness Multiple attempts at broad cancellation (partially blocked by courts) Divided; often opposed by those who did not take loans or already repaid them Largely halted broad forgiveness efforts Energy / climate regulations Pause on new oil/gas leases early on, strong emphasis on green energy transition, EV mandates Energy prices and energy independence were majority concerns Reversed many restrictions, prioritized domestic fossil fuel production Crime / policing messaging Early support for “reimagining” policing in some contexts; federal guidance shifted later Majority preferred stronger policing and were concerned about crime spikes in 2020–2022 Emphasis on law-and-order, support for police

Public Opinion

Polling on broad student-loan cancellation was consistently mixed to negative among the overall public:

• Strong support among younger voters, Democrats, and current borrowers.

• Significant opposition from people who never took out loans, already repaid them, or viewed cancellation as unfair to taxpayers and those who paid their debts.

• Many surveys showed the policy underwater or only narrowly supported once costs and fairness concerns were highlighted.

Important Context

• Not every Democratic-aligned policy was unpopular. Some (infrastructure spending, certain drug-price measures, background checks) polled well.

• Popularity is not uniform—Democratic voters often supported the above policies while independents and Republicans largely did not. National majorities frequently tilted against the more progressive versions on gender/sports and border enforcement.

• Many changes occurred via executive action or regulation rather than new statutes, which is why a subsequent administration could reverse them relatively quickly.

Executive Orders

Mr Trump has used Executive Orders 292 times to this date. Orders are not a fiat from Mr Trump, but are based on Congressionally enacted laws, and are sometimes subjected to judicial review.

This is a picture of a limited government: Each branch, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, limits the power of the other branches. Each branch's check on the other branches impedes the government's speed of action, thus giving the People time to respond when and if necessary.

Presidential executive order (EO) powers are real and significant but constitutionally limited. They are a tool every modern president has used extensively, including Donald Trump in both terms. Here is an analysis of their scope, legal foundation, practical reach, and constraints—especially relevant now that Democrats control Congress after the 2026 midterms.

Constitutional and Legal Basis

The U.S. Constitution does not mention “executive orders.” Authority derives from:

• Article II, Section 1 (Vesting Clause): “The executive Power shall be vested in a President…”

• Article II, Section 3 (Take Care Clause): The president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”

EOs are directives to the executive branch (agencies, departments, officers) on how to implement existing laws or manage operations. They carry the force of law within the executive branch when properly grounded, but they are not legislation.

The classic framework comes from Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952)*:

1. Maximum power — President acts with express or implied congressional authorization.

2. Zone of twilight — Congress is silent; power depends on circumstances.

3. Lowest ebb — President acts against the expressed or implied will of Congress. Courts are most skeptical here.

What Presidents Can Do via Executive Order

• Direct federal agencies on enforcement priorities, regulations, and internal management (e.g., immigration enforcement focus, energy permitting, workforce rules).

• Manage the federal workforce and contracting (within statutory bounds).

• Conduct foreign policy and national security actions (Commander-in-Chief powers are relatively strong).

• Implement or reinterpret statutes Congress has already passed.

• Reorganize aspects of the executive branch or set policy for government operations.

• Issue emergency declarations that unlock specific statutory powers (though these have limits and can be challenged).

Trump has used (and planned to continue using) EOs aggressively in areas such as immigration, tariffs/trade, deregulation, federal bureaucracy reductions, and related policy domains. Pre-election reporting indicated the White House prepared lists of unilateral actions precisely for the possibility of a Democratic Congress.

Hard Limits — What EOs Cannot Do

• Create new criminal laws or impose new taxes.

• Appropriate money (the “power of the purse” belongs exclusively to Congress under Article I).

• Override or repeal statutes passed by Congress.

• Seize private property or take major domestic actions without statutory or clear constitutional backing (see Youngstown).

• Dictate election rules that the Constitution assigns to states and Congress.

• Permanently bind future presidents (the next president can revoke them with a stroke of the pen).

Courts routinely review and sometimes block EOs. Challenges are common, especially on immigration, spending-related directives, and claims of exceeding statutory authority.

Practical Reality with a Democratic Congress (2027–2028)

• Stronger checks: Democrats can pass legislation to constrain or reverse EO-driven policies (subject to presidential veto, which requires a two-thirds override—unlikely with current margins). They control appropriations and can defund implementation of certain orders.

• Oversight pressure: Investigations, subpoenas, and public hearings will increase scrutiny and can slow or complicate execution.

• Judicial review intensifies: Expect more lawsuits; friendly or hostile district courts, circuit courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court will shape outcomes.

• Enduring presidential tools: Core Article II powers (foreign affairs, commander-in-chief, law execution within existing statutes, appointments of officials who share the president’s views) remain. Tariffs, immigration enforcement priorities, and agency management still offer substantial unilateral room.

• Historical pattern: Divided government does not eliminate EOs; it often increases their use as a workaround, while also increasing the rate of successful legal and political pushback.

Summary

Executive orders give a president considerable ability to shape how the federal government operates and prioritizes within the bounds of existing law and the Constitution. They are a powerful instrument of governance, especially on national security, foreign affairs, and agency direction. They are not a substitute for legislation and cannot rewrite the law or the Constitution.

In the current divided environment, Trump retains meaningful EO authority, but every significant order faces higher political, congressional, and judicial friction than it would under unified government. The ultimate boundaries are set by the text of statutes, the Constitution, and the willingness of courts to enforce those limits.

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*  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) background

In 1952, during the Korean War, a labor dispute threatened steel production. President Harry Truman issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate the nation’s steel mills, arguing it was necessary for national defense. The steel companies sued.

The Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that the seizure was unconstitutional. Justice Hugo Black’s majority opinion held that the president lacked both constitutional and statutory authority to seize private property in this way. The more enduring contribution, however, came from Justice Robert H. Jackson’s concurring opinion, which provided a practical, flexible framework still used by courts today.

 

The Insurrection Act

The Insurrection Act - Now the election is over.

The modern Insurrection Act is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255. It is an amalgamation of statutes dating back to the late 18th and 19th centuries (often still referred to collectively as the “Insurrection Act of 1807”). The key operative provisions are:

• § 251 – Allows the President to call into federal service the militia of any state (or use the armed forces) upon the request of a state’s legislature, or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, to suppress an insurrection against the state government.
• § 252 – Allows the President (without state consent) to use the militia or armed forces whenever “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States” make it impracticable to enforce federal laws in a state by ordinary judicial proceedings.
• § 253 – Allows the President (without state consent) to use the militia or armed forces to suppress insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy in a state that:
  • Hinders the execution of state or federal laws so that any part of the population is deprived of a constitutional right, and the state is unable, fails, or refuses to protect that right; or
  • Opposes or obstructs the execution of federal laws or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
• § 254 – Requires the President, before using force under the above sections, to issue a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably within a limited time.
• § 255 – Contains related definitions and technical provisions (including application to certain territories).

These sections create a major exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, which otherwise generally bars the use of federal military forces for domestic law enforcement.

Brief History of Changes

• 1792: The original Militia Acts authorized the President to call forth the militia to suppress insurrections, repel invasions, or enforce federal law when ordinary judicial processes were insufficient.
• 1807: Congress expanded the authority (the “Insurrection Act of 1807” proper) so the President could also use regular U.S. land and naval forces, not just the militia, in cases of insurrection or obstruction of the laws. Signed by President Thomas Jefferson.
• 1861: Expanded during the American Civil War to allow the President to use forces against rebellion even without a state’s request. This figures since Southern states were in rebellion against the central authority of Washington D.C.
• 1871: Further expanded (as part of the Enforcement Acts / Ku Klux Klan Act) to authorize federal intervention to protect constitutional rights when states failed or refused to do so—particularly relevant during Reconstruction.
• Later technical updates: Minor adjustments over time, including clarifications regarding territories (e.g., Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands) and renumbering of the code sections. A short-lived 2006 expansion related to natural disasters was largely reversed in 2008.

The core structure has remained largely unchanged for more than 150 years.

Current Objections and Support

Objections (commonly raised by civil liberties groups, some legal scholars, and members of both parties at different times):

• The language is extremely broad and grants the President wide unilateral discretion with few clear statutory guardrails or time limits.
• It is vulnerable to abuse, potentially allowing deployment of federal troops against civilians for political or law-enforcement purposes that fall short of genuine insurrection or rebellion.
• It lacks modern requirements for congressional notification, approval, or judicial review.
• Critics argue it is outdated and needs major reform (narrower triggers, clearer definitions, reporting requirements, and sunset provisions). Bills to reform or limit it have been introduced in recent Congresses.

Support / Defense of the Act:

• Proponents argue it remains a necessary emergency tool for rare but serious situations (large-scale rebellion, breakdown of civil order that state authorities cannot handle, or systemic denial of constitutional rights).
• Historical uses include suppressing early rebellions, enforcing federal authority during the Civil War and Reconstruction, protecting civil rights (e.g., school desegregation), and responding to major riots when requested by governors.
• Defenders note that presidents have used it sparingly in the modern era (last clear major invocation was 1992 in Los Angeles) and that political and practical constraints, along with the Posse Comitatus Act, provide some practical limits.
• Some view reform efforts as potentially weakening the federal government’s ability to respond to genuine domestic crises.

In short, the Act gives the President significant power to deploy military force domestically under defined but broad conditions. Debate centers on whether those conditions and safeguards are adequate for the 21st century. 

The law remains in full force.

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Afterword - The Posse Comitatus Act (1878)

This federal law generally prohibits the use of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force for domestic law enforcement purposes (such as making arrests, conducting searches, or policing civilians) unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress.

The Act was originally aimed at ending the use of federal troops to enforce Reconstruction-era policies in the South.

 

U.S. Social Security System Review

People wonder how sound is the Social Security System in the United States. Here are the most current figures based on official Social Security Administration (SSA) data and the 2026 Trustees Report.

1. How many years can the current system operate without changes in tax rates or benefit payments?

According to the 2026 Social Security Trustees Report (released June 2026):

• The combined Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI), collectively referred to as OASDI, Trust Funds are projected to be able to pay 100% of scheduled benefits until 2034.

• After the combined reserves are depleted in 2034, continuing tax income is projected to cover about 83% of scheduled benefits.

• Looking at the funds separately:

  • The larger OASI (retirement and survivors) fund is projected to be depleted in 2032, after which it could pay about 78% of scheduled benefits.

  • The DI (disability) fund is projected to remain solvent throughout the 75-year projection period.

In short, under current law and intermediate assumptions, the system can pay full scheduled benefits for roughly 8 more years (until 2034) on a combined basis, or about 6 years (until 2032) for the retirement fund alone. After those dates, benefits would be automatically reduced unless Congress acts.

2. How many recipients under age 65 are receiving some sort of benefit from the Social Security fund?

From the latest SSA Monthly Statistical Snapshot (data around mid-to-late 2026):

• Roughly 10.9 to 11 million people under age 65 receive Social Security benefits (primarily Disability Insurance benefits, plus some survivors and a smaller number of early retirees or other categories).

• In the June 2026 snapshot, the figure for “Disabled, under age 65” was approximately 10.97 million (this includes disabled workers, disabled widow(er)s, and disabled adult children in some tabulations). Additional younger survivors and a limited number of early claimants bring the under-65 total into the 11–16 million range depending on exact categories included, but the core under-65 disabled group is about 11 million.

The large majority of all Social Security beneficiaries (around 75–76 million total) are age 65 or older.

3. How many foreign citizens (non-citizens) are receiving some sort of benefit from the Social Security fund?

Precise, regularly published totals for non-citizens receiving regular Social Security (OASDI – retirement, survivors, and disability) benefits are limited.

• Non-citizens who are lawfully present in the United States and have earned sufficient work credits can qualify for benefits under the same rules as citizens.

• Undocumented immigrants are not eligible for Social Security benefits (even if they paid payroll taxes).

• For the separate Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, SSA data show roughly 300,000–320,000 non-citizen recipients in recent years (about 4.3% of SSI recipients in 2024 data).

• For the main Social Security (OASDI) program, no single recent public figure gives an exact nationwide count of non-citizen beneficiaries. Older analyses and limited releases have suggested the number is in the low hundreds of thousands, but it is not a dominant share of the roughly 71–72 million OASDI beneficiaries.

In short, lawfully present non-citizens who meet the work and eligibility rules do receive benefits, but they represent a relatively small fraction of total recipients. Exact current OASDI numbers are not published in the same straightforward monthly format as overall beneficiary counts.

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Sources:

• 2026 OASDI Trustees Report (SSA) https://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2026/

• SSA Monthly Statistical Snapshots (2026) https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/2026-08.html

• The latest SSA Annual Statistical reports on SSI and related publications  https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi_asr/

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Weapons Program

Iran possesses the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. The program is a central pillar of its military doctrine, designed for deterrence, power projection, and support of regional proxies. It has advanced steadily for four decades despite sanctions and international restrictions.

Historical Development

• 1980s origins: Began during the Iran-Iraq War with imported Scud-B missiles (later called Shahab-1) from Libya, Syria, and North Korea.
• 1990s–2000s: Expanded with North Korean assistance (Nodong technology → Shahab-3). Shift toward longer ranges and domestic production.
• 2010s onward: Major progress in solid-fuel motors (faster launch, more mobile and survivable), improved accuracy, and maneuverable re-entry vehicles. Iran also developed space-launch vehicles that share technology with longer-range missiles.

The program is controlled primarily by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force.

Current Capabilities (as of recent assessments)

Iran maintains a self-imposed range limit of roughly 2,000 km, publicly justified as sufficient to reach Israel and regional U.S. bases without threatening Europe. Key systems include:

Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, <1,000 km)

• Fateh-110 family and variants (Fateh-313, Zolfaghar, Dezful, etc.) — solid-fuel, increasingly precise, widely proliferated to proxies.
• Qiam-1 (liquid-fuel, ~700–800 km).

Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs, 1,000–2,000+ km)

• Shahab-3 and derivatives (Ghadr, Emad) — liquid-fuel, ~1,300–2,000 km.
• Sejjil — solid-fuel, two-stage, ~2,000 km.
• Khorramshahr / Kheibar series — heavier liquid-fuel systems, reported ranges up to 2,000–3,000 km in some variants.
• Fattah-1 — claimed hypersonic maneuvering capability (unveiled 2023), ~1,400 km.

Iran has conducted multiple large-scale attacks using these systems (notably against Israel in 2024 and later exchanges). Accuracy has improved but remains variable; many missiles are still area weapons rather than precision-guided in the Western sense.

Production and Survivability

Iran has invested heavily in underground “missile cities” and dispersed, hardened facilities. Recent Western intelligence assessments (2026) indicate that a substantial portion of its stockpile, launchers, and manufacturing capacity survived intensive strikes, allowing relatively rapid replenishment. Estimates of the pre-conflict arsenal capable of reaching Israel have been in the range of several hundred to around 2,000 missiles, though exact numbers are classified and contested.

International Restrictions and Policy Context

• UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (tied to the JCPOA) “called upon” Iran not to develop ballistic missiles designed to carry nuclear weapons for eight years (expired 2023).
• The JCPOA itself did not directly limit the missile program — a major criticism from opponents of the deal.
• Successive U.S. administrations (both parties) have sanctioned entities involved in the missile program. The Trump administration emphasized this gap in the JCPOA as a key reason for withdrawal.
• Iran has transferred missile technology and systems to the Houthis, Iraqi militias, and others, and has supplied ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine.

Strategic Role

The arsenal serves three main purposes:

1. Deterrence against Israel and the United States.
2. Ability to strike U.S. bases and partners across the Gulf.
3. Supply and enable proxies (especially precision and anti-ship variants).

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Disarming Iran

Iran’s ballistic missile program has shown continuous qualitative and quantitative improvement during both Democratic and Republican U.S. administrations. Sanctions slowed foreign assistance but did not halt domestic advances. The program remains one of the most persistent and least constrained elements of Iran’s military power.